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In the Supreme Court of

The State of Utah
TONY FLEl.VIETIS and
KATINA FLEME·TIS,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vs.J. WILLIAM McARTHUR and
MOSELLE ·McARTHUR,
husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 7345

CR.espondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order that the court will have a clear picture of the
background out of which this lawsuit arose, plaintiffs deem
it necessary to point out the following facts in addition to
those set forth by the defendants.
The escrow sales agreement covered four 40's of good
land and one 40 of arid, unimproved land. ·The aggregate
purchase price was Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000).
The land is all in the same section. The- defendants entered
into possession thereof and paid sufficient of the purchase
price that they were entitled, pursuant to the terms of the
agreement, to receive the deeds and water certificates on
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the good land. The appellants also received the assignments
on the Indian lease lands which were held by plaintiffs and
used in connection with the entire farm. The defendant
McArthur testified (Abstract bottom page 31) that the
poor 40 was "good for nothing". Nevertheless Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) of the twelve-thousand-dollar purchase price was held back pending the clearing of title defects on this poor 40. It is this Two Thousand Dollars
($2,000) and interest which plaintiffs sue to recover.
On August 8, 1946, after defendants had been in possession of all of said property, including said Indian leases,
for in excess of one year they sold ~and transferred the good
land and the Indian leases to one J. T. Bergstrom, a third
party. Moreover, on June 14, 1945, they granted a ten-year
lease on the oil and gas rights under the poor 40 to the
Sinclair Wyoming Oil Company for a period of ten years,
namely from June 14, 1945, to June 14, 1955; and finally,
on January 6, 1947, they sold the poor 40 to the same J. T.
Bergstrom and the said deed signed by J. W. McArthur
was left at the Roosevelt State Bank fior the signature of
his wife, where it reposed at the time suit was filed. Bergstrom paid valuable consideration for this deed (Abstract
pages 14 and 15).
Plaintiffs maintain that all conditions precedent in the
contract have been performed by them and that even if
there were now some title defect, defendants would not be
entitled to rescind the contract as to the poor 40 because
they have taken the good portions of the land and all of the
water right and the Indian leases and have s'Old and assigned
the same, and they have leased the underground rights on
the poor 40 in question and have in truth and in fact ex-
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3
ecuted a deed to the fee title thereof, which deed is held by
the Roosevelt State Bank for delivery to the said Bergstrom. Defendants cannot rescind under such circumstances.
I will proceed first to meet the three arguments of defendants as set forth in their brief.
I
RESERVATIONS IN THE PATENT
The first point which the defendants raise is that the
plaintiffs have failed to perform their conditions precedent
inasmuch as there is a reservation in the patent which the
defendants claim constitutes a cloud or defect in the title
and affects its marketability. This was an extremely interesting point of law a few years ago. At that time there
was some question as to whether or not such a reservation
constituted a defect in the title. There is no longer any
.question, and I am ~ertain that the following authorities
will amply sustain the statement I have just made. If the
court were to hold with the defendants on this proposition,
it would mean the opening of the floodgates of litigation as
the courts have stated. Practically all of the warranty
deeds which we have made for years. would be subject to
suit.
The reservation set forth in the patent at Entry 4 in
the abstract was inserted in the patent pursuant to an act
of Oongress. The act is as follows and may be found in
Title 43, United States Code Annotated, Section 945:
"Reservation in patents of right of way for
ditches or canals. In all patents for lands taken up
after August 30, 1890, under any of the land laws
. of the United States or on entries or claims validated by the Act of August 30, 1890, west of the
one hundredth meridian, it shall be expressed that
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there is reserved from the lands in said patent
described a right of way thereon for ditches or
canals constructed by the authodty of the United
States. (Aug. 30, 1890, c. 837, Section 1, 26 Stat.
391.)"
This section in U. S. C. A. is annotated. The important annotations, however, appear in the Cumulative Annual Pocket Parts of 1947. There the controlling cases are
set forth.
Defendants in their brief, page 10, state that, "by
such reservations the courts have construed the same to
be a limitation of title ..." The defendants fail, however,
to set forth a single case or authority which sustains their
position. The case of Griffith vs. Cole, 264 Federal 396
cited by defendants in their brief 'at the top of page 10 is
not remotely in point. I am unable to find the other case
cited ,that of U. S. vs. Haga, 271 Federal 41, cited at the
top of page 10 of the brief. None of the cases set forth on
pages 12 and 13 appear to be in point. So much for defendants' brief on this point.
Maupin on Marketable Title to Real Estate, 3rd Edition, page 383, states that the purchaser must take notice of
public statutes restricting the use of the granted premises;
and such restrictions constitute no breach of the covenant
of warranty.
The fundamental point to be borne in mind in considering this objection raised by the defendants is that
we have a public statute involved, and the same must be
noticed by all parties dealing with land.
The rule i~s well stated by Brandeis in the Farmers &
Merchants Bank vs. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649,
43 Supreme Court 651, 67 L. Ed. 1157, and 30 A. L. R. 635 as
frollows:
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"Laws which subsist at the time and place of
the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully
as if they had been expressly r.eferred to or incorporated in its terms~ This principal embraces alike
those laws which affect its construction and those
which affect its enforcement or discharge."
There are two recent cases which are squarely in
point and which, in my judgment, are controlling in reas~n
and in authority on the specific point at issue. These two
cases, one decided by the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington on January 17, 1942, and one decided by the
supreme court of South Dakota on January 22, 1942, were,
of course, decided independently. They both arrive at the
same conclusion, and they both involve as a defense the
specific statute which has been raised by the defendants
in this case. I might point out, however, that in my judgment the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has
done a much better job of analysis, perhaps because they
are a little closer to the scene of irrigation here in the
West. These cases are:
Walsh vs. Bellamy, (South Dak<ota) 2 Northwestern
2nd 102. In this case the parties entered into a contract
whereby the plaintiff obligated herself to convey the premises by good and sufficient warranty deed free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances and to furnish abstract of
title showing the title to the premises to be in merchantable condition and free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. Please observe that this is almost identically the
provision of the Flemetis-McArthur contract before us. The
defendant pleaded as a defense that the title was not free
and clear of liens and encumbrances because of the right
of way reservation in the patent which was inserted pur-
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suant to the Act of Congress which I have heretofore quoted
in full in this brief.
The court quotes from Maupin on Marketable Title
and sets forth the cases which are cited in that work in
support of the doctrine hereinabove announced, namely the
case of Neeson, et al vs. Bray, 19 New York Supplement
841, and the case of Richardson-Kellett Company vs. Kline,
70 Florida 23, 69 Southern 203. The court points out that
in the latter case it was held that in the conveyance of a
part of the Everglades swamp land a reservation of a right
in favor of the State to enter upon the land for the purpose of constructing a system of drainage canals, if necessary, did not .render the title defective. The court also cites
the case of In Thomas vs. Wood, 37 Federal 2nd 856, which
appears to hold the same as the Kline case. The court in
that case states:
"The restrictions are a matter of public knowledge and the parties dealing with the title contract
with reference thereto, and the restrictions become a part of the contract of sale and purchase."
Apparently the only case which is cited to the contrary is the case of Cosby vs. Danziger, 38 California Appeal
204, 175 Pacific 809. That ease, however, is not an authority against the general propositions hereinabove cited. The
Walsh vs. Bellamy case under West Keynote 7 at page
105 of 2 Northwest 2nd distinguishes that case, and the
Cosby vs. Danziger case is even more clearly distinguished
in the Washington case which I will presently cite. The
important point of disrtinction to notice is that in the Cosby
vs. Danziger case the patent hadn't been recorded, and the
buyer didn't know under what chain of title he would fall.
The case is clearly distinguishable and is distinguished by
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both of these recent 1942 Supren:te Court decisions.
I think the best case on the subject is that of Dopps
vs. Alderman, (Washington) 121 Pacific 2nd 388. In this
case there was a contract for sale by good and marketable
title and there was pleaded the specific reservation which
is pleaded by defendants in this action, and the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington holds that that reservation in the patent does not constitute a defect in the title.
The court makes a good analysis of the entire subject, sets
forth the authorities and texts, and distinguishes the cases
which were cited in opposition to the doctrine. The distinction in the case of Cosby vs. Danziger is pointed out, and
there are additional cases cited for support of the proposition first hereinabove advanced, namely that such a reservation in the patent does not constitute a defect in the title.
It is my understanding that defendants do not contend that the existence of the Indian canal which runs
across the 40 in question constitutes any defect in the
title. They did not so contend at the trial and if I read
their brief correctly, do not apparently so contend on appeal, and I am certain that even if they were now to make
such contention that the same could not be sustained. They,
of course, knew that large canal was on the premises when
they made the contract. The court so found. The leading
case on this proposition where there is a visible canal easement is Schurger vs. Moorman, . decided by the Supreme
Court of Idaho in 1911, 117 Pacific 122. This case is cited in
all of the texts and by most of the subsequent cases.' In
that case there was a canal running across the land of the
plaintiff, which is a parallel situation to ~he Indian canal
which runs across the 40-acre parcel involved in this law-
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suit. The issues involved in that case are well set forth
by the court at page 123 as follows:
"The appellant contends that the easement
and right of way for a canal across the lands constitutes an incumbrance, and would amount to a
breach of the covenant against incumbrances on
the land. The respondent, on the other hand, insists that an easement and right of way for an
irrigation canal, being an obvious and notorious
servitude upon the land and being of permanent
character and essential for the reclamation of an
arid country, does not fall within the category
of incumbrances against which a convenant of warranty runs."
The court holds that the existence of a canal which is
a permanent easement did not impair the marketability of
the title. The essence of the decision and of the great many
cases which support the same. proposition is that parties
who contract concerning a piece of property over which
runs visible easements such as a highway or a large permanent waterway are presumed to have had knowJedge
of the existence of such easements and to have contracted
with reference to them. This Idaho case cites a great number of cases from throughout the United States on this
general proposition, and all of these cases with the exception of a few old Eastern decisions sustain the proposition
which I have mentioned and which is set forth in the Idaho
case.
'Brewster on Conveyancing, Section 203, states:
"In cases where there is a physical burden of
this sort, which is visible, there is a fair and rea-.
sonable presumption, in the absence of an express
agreement, that both parties act with reference
to this plain, existing burden, and that the vendor
on the one hand demands, and the vendee on the
other pays, only the fair value of the land as vis-
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ably incumbered. Therefore, it is said such burdens, by way of open and notorious easements,
are not really incumbrances wi'thin the meaning
of this covenant, because the real subject-matter
of the dealings between the grantor and the
grantee is the land, subject to visible easements."
See the case of Sisk vs. Caswell, a California case, in
122 Pacific 185. There is a presumption, the California
court states, under all authorities that the parties act
with reference to a plain, existing easement or burden
when they contract pertaining to the land. This is so of
those burdens or easements which are permanent in their
nature.
See also the case of Feldhut vs. Brummitt, a Kansas
case, reported in 150 Pacific 549 and decided in 1915. This
case holds that an established irrigation ditch, plainly observable on the property was not an encumbrance to the
extent of being a breach of covenant. This Kansas case
cites the Colorado case of Erikson vs. Whitescarver, 57
Colorado 409, 142 Pacific 413. The Kansas case, however,
does not carefully analyze the Colorado case and apparently thinks that the Colorado case is a contrary decision;
whereas, in truth and in fact, it is not as a reading of the
case will clearly disclose.
The Colorado case last referred to involved a sale of
some building lots in the City of Denver. There were some
ditch rights of way across these city building lots. The
court held that they constituted a breach of the warranty
against encumbrances. The court, however, makes the following significant statement:
"What might be the rule where lands encumbered by a right of way for an irrigation ditch
and conveyed for agricultural purposes of which
the vendee had notice at the time of the con-
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veyance is not involved and what we have said
on the subject of any such easement is confined
and limited to the facts before us."

&tch!

II

ecutio

THE STRAY MORTGAGE AT ENTRY 10 OF ABSTRACT
The ~ppeUants next complain of the mortgage shown
at Entry 10 in the Abstract of Title. This mortgage was
executed by a stranger to the title. It does not specifically
purport to even cover the 40 in question. It covered the
water and rights of way of the Farmers Irrigation Company which ran across Section 1, Towns:hip 1 South, Range
4 West of the Uintah Special Meridian, of which this 40
was a part. The court found, and the evidence sustains
the finding, that no portion of the canal or lateral system
of the Farmers Irrigation Company touched the 40 in
question, and this 40 had no water right whatsoever in
the Farmers Irrigation Company or in any other company
at all. I think the rule is well established that a mortgage
executed by a stranger to the title is not a defect so long
as there is no occupant of the property claiming under
such instrument and the purchaser has no actual knowledge
of a valid claim by parties who are strangers to the title
(Title Standard No. _9 Utah State Bar, Bar Bulletin August 19, 1947, and cases there cited). Because of the fact
that no portion of the Farmers Irrigation Company canal
or lateral system touched the land in question and because
it is an arid 40 having no water right whatsoever, this mortgage by a stranger to the title covering waters and easements does not constitute a defect impairing the marketability of the title.
lt is true there were some ditches on the 40 in question
which were used to transport waste water from the Dry
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Gulch Irrigation Company which was transported through
the Farmers Irrigation Company canal, but these small
ditches were constructed subsequent to the date of the execution of the stray mortgage. The mortgage was executed
and recorded in the year 1935. The ditches were not constructed until after the plaintiffs acquired the property in
1939. Said mortgage executed four years before these waste
ditches were constructed could not possibly affect them.

It will also be observed that an auditor's tax deed on
the property was executed on April 10, 1937. The case of
Hanson vs. Burris 46 Pacific 2nd 400 at pages 406 and 407
stands for the proposition that a purchaser from the County takes a new and complete title _in the land under an
independent grant of sovereign authority which bars or
extinguishes all prior claims.
Defendants cannot successfully set up this stray mortgage in defense of the action. I repeat there was no mortgage on any water right belonging to this 40-acre tract
simply because there was no water right whatsoever, and
the mortgage was not upon any easement or right of way
over this 40, first, because no ditch was constructed until
after the mortgage was given; second, because no right
of way was ever deeded to the Farmers Irrigation Company (the abstract of title shows none); third, no such
right of way was acquired by the Farmers Irrigation Company by -prescription because the p~escriptive period could
not have run; fourth, a new title was initiated in plaintiffs
through the issuance of an auditor''s tax deed after the
mortgage was given; and fifth, defendants used these
ditches themselves for the benefit of both their good and
poor land, and they are in no position to complain becauae
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of their existence. They knew that they were there at the
time they made the contract, and they must be held to have
made the contract in contemplation of these small waste
ditches.
III
CAROLINA(E) THOMPSON DEED
In their brief defendants for the first time claim a
defect in the title because at Entry 8 of the abstract of title
the quit claim deed from Duchesne County runs to' one
Carolina(e) Thompson. This alleged defect was never
urged at the trial, was not argued orally, and was not so
much as mentioned in the written trial brief filed by the
defendants_. The only defects urged or considered at the
trial or in the briefs were those hereinbefore set forth under
Topics I and II pertaining to the reservations in the patent
and the stray mortgage at Entry 10 of the abstract of title.
Defendants are put to rather strange and forced seasoning when they state in their brief at the bottom of page
10 that, "There is no instrument in said abstract disclosing that the title of Carolina Thompson has been divested
of him ('Sic) or that his wife (sic) has been divested of her
inchoate right." Throughout all of the months of preparation on this case and the intensive work done at the
trial it never occurred to defendants that the name Caro..
lina(e) Thompson referred to other than a female. Now
the first time, in an effort to defeat plaintiffs of their
just dues under the contract defendants have discovered
that the word Carolina (e) is of masculine gender! Carolina Thompson made, executed and delivered deed to Fie~etis November 15, 1939.

* * * * *
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I believe that the foregoing cases and arguments amply
meet the contentions of defendants in their brief. As
pointed out above, however, the position of the defendants
is that even after having accepted all of the good land and
all of the water under the contract and having sold and
disposed of the same and after having accepted and trans~
ferred the Indian leases and after having conveyed the
underground rights on the poor 40 in question and having
executed a deed to J. T. Bergstrom therefor in 1947, two
years after the contract was made, that they are now in a
position to rescind the contract as to this worthless 40 and
withhold the payment of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000)
on the contract.
The defendants cannot rescind the contract under the
facts and circumstances disclosed under any theory of the
case.
IV
REMEDY OF RESCISSION

In considering the doctrine of rescission the court
should bear in mind these propositions :
1. There must be no other adequate legal remedy.
2. Rescission is a proceeding in equity, and it must be
just and equitable under the circumstances of the case.
3. The defendants must show that they can place the
other party in statu quo, that is the party pleading rescis~
sion must be able to restore the consideration.
4. Since rescission is a proceeding in equity the .party
claiming it must act in. good faith and within a reasonable
time. An unreasonable delay prevents the imposition of
the doctrine.
Defendants, in order to invoke the doctrine of rescis...
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sion, must come into court in an equitable position themselves. They do not thus present themselves according to
the admitted facts, because:
(1) Defendant McArthur knew of the existence of the
small ditches and of the Indian canal upon the 40 in question at the time he made the contract, and he certainly
knew of their existence after he took possession of the
property.
(2) Notwithstanding this fact and after his perfect
knowledge of the condition of the premises, he made and
entered into a written ten-year lease on the underground
rights covering the forty in litigation to the Sinclair Wyoming Oil Company. That lease appears in the abstract of
title at Entry 24. Defendants receive Fifty Dollars ($50)
annual rental. They have been receiving that rental and
presumably are still receiving it, and they have the right
also to receive one-eighth of the oil and gas produced and
sold from the premises. The fact of their execution of that
ten-year lease on the underground rights on this particular
40 would bar them from bringing a proceeding for rescission if there were no other principal involved. How can these
defendants have the hardihood to come into a court of
equity and ask this court to compel the plaintiffs to take
back this . worthless land and lose Two Thousand Dollars
when they have executed a ten-year lease on the underground· rights and have received the rental therefrom, all
of which was done after the defendants went into actual
physical possession of the land and_ knew of the existence
of the canal and ditches thereon, and after they had actually used these ditches for the irrigation of a portion of this
40-acre parcel ?
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(3) The defendants did more than this. After they
had gone into possession and after they had leased the underground rights on the 40 in question, they proceeded in
full knowledge of all of the facts to ·sell the entire wateT
right and all the valuable 40's of the farm which they had
contracted to purchase. In order to have rescission the defendants must be in a position to restore to the other party
the consideration received. It is utterly impossible for the
defendants to make any such restoration of ~he property
because they have sold the good land and water rights as
well as the Indian leases which were covered by the contract. They have sold the underground rights on the 40 in
question, and they have, in truth and in fact, sold the 40acre parcel itself.
(4) Plaintiffs introduced in evidence the three-hundred-dollar check dated January 6, 1947, which defendant
McArthur received from one J. T. Bergstrom, a third party,
in payment of the purchase price for this 40-acre tract. We
also introduced the quit claim deed which defendant McArthur executed thereon and left at the Roosevelt State
Bank for the signature of his wife. So we have a situation
wherein the defendants have actually sold this land which
is the subject of our present lawsuit and upon which they
seek a rescission. This is contrary to all of the law concernIng this doctrine, and it is utterly impossible for defendants
to have a rescission of this contract when they have sold
the land which is the suhject of the suit. In order to
have a rescission they would have to restore the consideration, namely the good land as well as the poor land, and take
their money back. Defendants_ are not in a position to do
this. They do not offer to restore anything. They do not
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offer to do equity. They seek to get out of ·a just obligation to pay Two Thousand Dollars to plaintiffs.
(5) Let me point out one other reason why McArthur cannot have a rescission. It is unquestioned that
defendants received transfer of the Indian lands referred
to in the contract, and it is further unquestioned that defendants irrevocably transferred these Indian lands to
Bergstrom, a third party, and if plaintiffs are now compelled to take back this 40-acre parcel of land, they stand
deprived of the Indian lease lands which plaintiffs yielded
to defendants when the contract was made. It is utterly
impossible to find that defendants under any theory of the
case are entitled to rescission.
(6) An unreasonable delay prevents the imposition
of the doctrine. 8 Thompson on Real Property at page 589
sets forth the rule as follows:
"The right to rescind may be lost by laches.
The law requires the injured person to seek his remedy without unreasonable delay after discovering
the facts justifying rescission. A person cannot be
deprived of his remedy in equity on the grounds of
laches unless it appears that he had, or ought to
have had, knowledge of his rights. Upon discovery
of the grounds entitling him to rescission, he must
act with reasonable promptness to avoid the imputation of acquiescence, and he must act under cir·cumstances consistent with good faith. The period
within which the right of rescission must be exercised is to be. determined by the facts peculiar to
each case."
I do not think that there can be any question but what
defendants in this case have not acted with reasonable dispatch in asserting rescission. The contract was made in
1945, and defendants entered into possession of the property and after becoming fully apprised of all of the facts
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and circumstances concerning the same, they sat by for a
period of two years and as late an January 6, 1947, treated
the contract now before the court as being in full force and
effect because on the latter date they delivered the deed to
the 40-acre tract, which is the subject of this suit, at the
Roosevelt State Bank in favor of the third party, Bergstrom.
If there were now some title defect (which we deny)
defendants' remedy would be for damages and not for recission.
CONCLUSION
All principals of law and equity and ali evidence, in
my judgement, lead to the conclusion that judgement in
this case must be sustained. This scheme of defendants to
get everything that was any good from plaintiffs, namely
the good land, the water rights, and the Indian lands; and
to try and turn back an unimproved, rocky, arid 40-acre tract
now encumbered by a ten-year lease of underground rights
and an outstanding deed in favor of a third party Bergstrom on the surface rights; and retain Two Thousand Dollars of the agreed consideration, smacks of bad faith if
not something worse. This court should not lend its aid
thereto.
Respectfully submitted,
THERALD N. JENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondents
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